The problem is definitely more precise now, thanks for clearing that up. The two paradigms you described seem perfectly adequate to describe how human dealings with non-human animals could work. I have one question, though. I suppose that was inevitable.

If the paradigm towards wild animals is similar to that of a peaceful foreign nation which needs to be left alone, what happens when humanity needs to expand? There is only so much space and so many resources on this planet, and barring our inevitable migration out into the solar system and beyond, human interests will come into conflict with those of animals. Nearly every scrap of land that is now free from human habitation (or industrialization) is inhabited by some form of animal life or another…so are we simply not allowed to press any farther than the borders we’ve already created? What of the wild animals that co-exist with us in our towns and cities? Non-human animals are incapable, as you pointed out, of communicating with us in any useful way as regards their own interests. They don’t have councils, can’t send delegations, etc. So how do we settle the inevitable conflict between our interests and theirs if only our side is capable of making the decision?

Note that I am not saying that there aren’t plenty of ways to *reduce* the amount of space and resources that humanity needs, and ways to make less of an impact on our animal fellows. But there just doesn’t seem to me to be a way to avoid some sort of encroachment onto animal “national territory.” Do you think some sort of compromise would be neccessary, and what form would that take?

I realize I’m just compounding the problem by asking more questions, but I am as always, intrigued to hear your thoughts. Thanks again for taking the time to answer, I look forward to your next post (on whatever subject.)

You weren’t kidding when you said it was heavy. *scratches head* I decided to include my thoughts on your last post in this comment, as well, since that post laid the groundwork for this one.

From what I could understand…aww hell, I may as well be honest. I really couldn’t understand most of it. I attribute this more to my lack of education in philosophy than any failure to adequately explain on your part. I caught some snatches that made sense, though. Like this:

“Firstly: to treat a person’s thoughts as properties of an object involves significantly changing their content, away from the content they have as thought by the other person. When they think some thought, they themselves are the subject, i.e. the ‘general limit of the world’, and not some object in it – just like the eye is not visible in the visual field, but has a different sort of presence there. So by objectifying them, you adjust how the thought in question is constructed.

But the point of truth is to adhere as closely as possible to the thing being thought about – any change in how it’s represented from how it really is, makes something less true. Hence empathy, which avoids this change, is truer than objectification.”

That is indeed the point of truth – not to look at things in a way that is most convenient, but in a way that most closely matches what you really observe. We as humans are able to observe that other beings which we classify as human have roughly similar thoughts and feelings, such that we can share a common language and (as you demonstrated) recreate the experience of what we see them go through from our own perspective. So we assume (rightly) that “blueness” is pretty much the same experience for everyone, as is sadness or happiness or any other experience. When we see another person looking at a blue object, or acting depressed, or acting happy, we re-create that experience in our own minds and thus “empathize.” Hope I got that part right.

Then we have this:

“So, the second argument is this: that objectification involves treating the other person’s thoughts (which we have recreated) the same way we treat imaginary thoughts, the same way we treat the doings and thoughts of characters in books. To not empathise, in short, is to implicitly suppose that the consciousness of others is not really real, but is more like a fun story to imagine.

But that’s not true, is it?”

This made sense to me (as a theory), I am just not sure how true it is, either. I agree that we have to try to prove that objectification is irrational, but what form does this error take, is the question. It seems counter-intuitive to me to assume that non-empathetic people are walking around convinced (even subconsciously) that everyone else and their feelings are just a fantasy. Or maybe it’s so close to the truth that it’s right in front of our noses, and thus hard to see. In any case, my brain hurts, now. Keep it up, though, Alderson. Someone has to do the philosophical heavy-lifting.

Well, impositions on oneself will be viewed negatively when they impinge on our goals, and impositions on others will be viewed negatively when they impinge on our goals. So far there’s no big difference.

“imagine doing the calculations for the death ray on the Death Star. Here, being rational is probably unethical.”
You really think this is a problem? It seems pretty simple to say that it’s rational to correctly work out the right answer (though in an unrelated sense – it’s process that uses reason, which need not mean that it’s an action we have rational grounds to engage in) but immoral to use that answer in the construction of the death star.

As with some irrational behaviour being ethical and vice versa, I don’t think this is controversial. Mathematics is generally seen as inherently logical. But imagine doing the calculations for the death ray on the Death Star. Here, being rational is probably unethical. Meanwhile, being irrational and sabotaging it (perhaps subconsciously, perhaps because you are being forced to do the calculations) is probably ethical.